

# Simple Games beyond Weighted Majority Games

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## Back in the USSR



Ustinov



Brezhnev



Kosygin

The three top state officials, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence, all had “nuclear suitcases”. Any two of them could authorise a launch of a nuclear warhead. No one could do it alone.



# US Senate



**United States Senate** rules permit a senator, or a number of senators, to speak for as long as they wish and on any topic they choose, unless a supermajority of the Senate (60 Senators) brings debate to a close by invoking cloture.

# UN Security Council



The 15 member **UN Security Council** consists of five permanent and 10 non-permanent countries. A passage requires:

- approval of at least nine countries,
- subject to a veto by any one of the permanent members.

# Simple Games

The set  $P = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  denotes the set of players.

## Definition

A **simple game** is a pair  $G = (P, W)$ , where  $W$  is a subset of the power set  $2^P$ , different from  $\emptyset$ , which satisfies the monotonicity condition:

*if  $X \in W$  and  $X \subset Y \subseteq P$ , then  $Y \in W$ .*

Coalitions from  $W$  are called **winning**. We also denote

$$L = 2^P \setminus W$$

and call coalitions from  $L$  **losing**.

## Significant Publications

Simple games are far from being simple. They are discussed in:

- von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944) *Theory of games and economic behavior*. Princeton University Press. Princeton. NJ
- Shapley, L.S (1962) *Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theory*. Behavioral Science 7: 59–66
- Taylor, A.D., and W.S. Zwicker (1999) *Simple games*. Princeton University Press. Princeton. NJ

# Weighted Majority Games

## Definition

A simple game  $G$  is called a **weighted majority game** if there exists a weight function  $w: P \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^+$ , where  $\mathcal{R}^+$  is the set of all non-negative reals, and a real number  $q$ , called **quota**, such that

$$X \in W \iff \sum_{i \in X} w_i \geq q.$$

Such game is denoted

$$[q; w_1, \dots, w_n].$$

## Weights for Games in Examples

Nuclear suitcases game:

$$[2; 1, 1, 1].$$

American Senate game:

$$[60; 1, 1, 1, \dots, 1].$$

UN Security Council game:

$$[39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].$$

Does every game have weights?




## Rigid Magic Squares

On the right you see a magic square. A **rigid magic square** will have:









- The sum in every row and in every column is equal to  $q$ .
- No other subset of the numbers has the sum equal to  $q$ .

2	7	6	→	15
9	5	1	→	15
4	3	8	→	15
↙	↓	↓	↓	↘
15	15	15	15	15

Such number  $q$  will be called a **threshold**.



## A Rigid Magic Square

 200011011	 020101101	 002110110
 011200011	 101020101	 110002110
 011011200	 101101020	 110110002

The quota is


$$q = 222222222.$$

## Gabelman's game $Gab_n$

### Example

Let us take an  $n \times n$  rigid magic square with threshold  $q$  and  $n^2$  of players, one for each cell. We assign to a player the weight in his cell.

- Coalitions whose weight is  $> q$  are winning.
- Coalitions whose weight is  $< q$  are losing.
- Rows are winning.
- Columns are losing.



No system of weights can be found for this game.

# Trading transform

## Definition

The sequence of coalitions

$$\mathcal{T} = (X_1, \dots, X_j; Y_1, \dots, Y_j)$$

is called a **trading transform** if the coalitions  $X_1, \dots, X_j$  can be converted into the coalitions  $Y_1, \dots, Y_j$  by rearranging players.

In Gabelman's game  $Gab_3$  with 9 players

$$\mathcal{T} = (Row_1, Row_2, Row_3; Col_1, Col_2, Col_3)$$

is a trading transform.

# Yet another trading transform



after 1 hour



after  $n$  hours



## A criterion of weightedness

### Definition

A simple game is *k-trade robust* if for all  $j \leq k$  no trading transform

$$\mathcal{T} = (X_1, \dots, X_j; Y_1, \dots, Y_j)$$

exists where  $X_1, \dots, X_j$  are winning and  $Y_1, \dots, Y_j$  are losing.

### Theorem (Taylor & Zwicker, 1992)

*For a simple game  $G$  the following is equivalent:*

1.  *$G$  is weighted.*
2.  *$G$  is trade robust.*
3.  *$G$  is  $2^{2^n}$ -trade robust.*

# Function $f$

## Definition

Let  $G$  be a simple game and

$$\mathcal{T} = (X_1, \dots, X_j; Y_1, \dots, Y_j)$$

a trading transform where  $X_1, \dots, X_j$  are winning and  $Y_1, \dots, Y_j$  are losing (so  $G$  is not  $j$ -trade robust). Then we call  $\mathcal{T}$  a **certificate of non-weightedness**.

## Definition

If  $G$  is weighted we set  $f(G) = \infty$ . Otherwise  $f(G)$  is the length of the shortest certificate of non-weightedness. For games with  $n$  players we define

$$f(n) = \max_{f(G) \neq \infty} f(G).$$

## Bounds on function $f$

In terms of the function  $f$  the results known to date can be summarised as follows:

$$\lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor \leq f(n) \leq 2^{2^n}.$$

Theorem (Gvozdeva-Slinko, 2009)

$$\left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor \leq f(n) \leq (n+1)2^{\frac{1}{2}n \log_2 n}.$$

The idea of the proof for the lower bound can be illustrated on the following example.

## The Idea of the Lower Bound

Consider weights  $(w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5) = (1, 2, 5, 6, 10)$ . Then:

Equality	Total weight		Equality	Total weight
13 ~ 4	6	→	136 ~ 46	6+106=112
14 ~ 23	7		147 ~ 237	7+105=112
25 ~ 134	12		258 ~ 1348	12+100=112
34 ~ 15	11		349 ~ 159	11+101=112

We add :  $(w_6, w_7, w_8, w_9) = (106, 105, 100, 101)$  and define

- Coalitions whose weight is  $> 112$  are winning.
- Coalitions whose weight is  $< 112$  are losing.
- 46, 237, 1348, 159 are winning.
- 136, 147, 258, 349 are losing.

This gives us  $f(9) \geq 4$ .

# Rough weights

## Definition

A simple game  $G$  is called **roughly weighted** if there exists a weight function  $w: P \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^+$ , not identically equal to zero, and a non-negative real number  $q$ , called **quota**, such that for  $X \in 2^P$


$$\sum_{i \in X} w_i > q \implies X \in W,$$

$$\sum_{i \in X} w_i < q \implies X \in L.$$

We say  $[q; w_1, \dots, w_n]$  is a **rough voting representation** for  $G$ .

## An Example of Roughly Weighted Majority Game

This Kingdom has 9 provinces. A passage requires approval of at least three provinces, not all of which are neighbours.




We assign weight 1 to every province. Then:

- Coalitions whose weight is  $> 3$  are winning.
- Coalitions whose weight is  $< 3$  are losing.

Gabelman's games are not weighted but they are roughly weighted. So are our examples. Does every simple game have rough weights?

## The Fano plane game



We take  $P = \{1, 2, \dots, 7\}$  and the lines  $X_1, \dots, X_7$  as minimal winning coalitions:

$\{1, 2, 3\}, \{1, 4, 5\}, \{1, 6, 7\}, \{2, 5, 7\},$   
 $\{3, 4, 7\}, \{3, 5, 6\}, \{2, 4, 6\}.$

Then the sequence

$$\mathcal{T} = (X_1, \dots, X_7, P; X_1^c, \dots, X_7^c, \emptyset)$$

is a certificate of non-weightedness of  $G$ . But it shows more: the absence of rough weights.

## A criterion of rough weightedness

Theorem (Gvozdeva-Slinko, 2009)

*A game  $G$  is roughly weighted if for no  $j$  there exists a certificate of non-weightedness of the form*

$$\mathcal{T} = (X_1, \dots, X_j, P; Y_1, \dots, Y_j, \emptyset). \quad (\star)$$

Certificates of the form  $(\star)$  we call **potent**.

This theorem leads to the introduction of another function.

### Definition

Let the number of players be  $n$ . If  $G$  is roughly weighted, then  $g(G) = \infty$ . Else, let  $g(G)$  be the length of the shortest potent certificate of non-weightedness of the form, and

$$g(n) = \max_{g(G) \neq \infty} g(G).$$

## Bounds for $g$

In particular,  $g(\text{Fano}) = 8$ , while  $f(\text{Fano}) = 2$ . In particular,

$$g(7) \geq 8.$$

Theorem (Gvozdeva-Slinko, 2009)

For  $n \geq 5$

$$2n + 3 \leq g(n) < (n + 1)2^{\frac{1}{2}n \log_2 n}.$$

## More Definitions

### Definition

A simple game  $G$  is called **proper** if

$$X \in W \implies X^c \in L,$$

**strong** if

$$X \in L \implies X^c \in W,$$

and a **constant sum game** if  $G$  is both proper and strong.

- Nuclear suitcases game and EEC: constant sum games
- American Senat and UN Security Council: proper but not strong.
- Gamelman's game: strong but not proper.

# Weightedness of Small Games

## Theorem (Shapley, 1962)

*The following games are weighted:*

- *every game with 3 or less players,*
- *every strong or proper game with 4 or less players,*
- *every constant sum game with 5 or less players.*

# Rough Weightedness of Small Games

Theorem (Gvozdeva-Slinko, 2009)

*The following games are roughly weighted:*

- *every game with 4 or less players,*
- *every strong or proper game with 5 or less players,*
- *every constant sum game with 6 or less players.*

# The $\mathcal{A}$ -Hierarchy

## Definition

Let  $q$  be a rational number. A game  $G$  belongs to the class  $\mathcal{A}_q$  of  $\mathcal{A}$ -hierarchy if  $G$  possesses a potent certificate of nonweightedness

$$(X_1, \dots, X_m; Y_1, \dots, Y_m),$$

with  $\ell$  grand coalitions among  $X_1, \dots, X_m$  and  $\ell$  empty coalitions among  $Y_1, \dots, Y_m$ , such that  $q = \ell/m$ . If  $\alpha$  is irrational, we set  $\mathcal{A}_\alpha = \bigcap_{q < \alpha} \mathcal{A}_q$ .

The larger the parameter  $\alpha$  the more power is given to some relatively small coalitions.

# The $\mathcal{A}$ -Hierarchy

## Theorem

*If  $0 < \alpha < \beta < \frac{1}{2}$ , then  $\mathcal{A}_\alpha \supsetneq \mathcal{A}_\beta$ . Every simple non-weighted game belongs to one of the classes  $\mathcal{A}_\alpha$  for  $\alpha \in [0, \frac{1}{2})$ .*


## Definition

A game  $G$  is **critical** for  $\mathcal{A}_\alpha$  if it belongs to  $\mathcal{A}_\alpha$  but does not belong to any  $\mathcal{A}_\beta$  for  $\beta > \alpha$ .

## Example

$\mathcal{A}_0$  is comprised of non-weighted roughly weighted games.  
Fano is critical for  $\mathcal{A}_{1/8}$ .

## Two thresholds for the Fano plane game



We take  $P = \{1, 2, \dots, 7\}$  and the lines  $X_1, \dots, X_7$  as minimal winning coalitions:

$\{1, 2, 3\}, \{1, 4, 5\}, \{1, 6, 7\}, \{2, 5, 7\},$   
 $\{3, 4, 7\}, \{3, 5, 6\}, \{2, 4, 6\}.$

Then we can assign weight one to every player and tell, that

- Coalitions whose weight is  $> 4$  are winning.
- Coalitions whose weight is  $< 3$  are losing.
- Coalition whose weight is 3 is winning if it is a line.
- Coalition whose weight is 4 is winning if it contains a line.

## $\mathcal{B}$ -Hierarchy

### Definition


A simple game  $G = (P, W)$  belongs to  $\mathcal{B}_k$  if there exist real numbers  $0 < q_1 \leq q_2 \leq \dots \leq q_k$ , called thresholds, and a weight function  $w: P \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$  such that

- (a) if  $\sum_{i \in X} w(i) > q_k$ , then  $X$  is winning,
- (b) if  $\sum_{i \in X} w(i) < q_1$ , then  $X$  is losing,
- (c) if  $q_1 \leq \sum_{i \in X} w(i) \leq q_k$ , then

$$w(X) = \sum_{i \in X} w(i) \in \{q_1, \dots, q_k\}.$$

Weights of losing coalitions

Weights of winning coalitions




Weights of winning and losing coalitions

## $\mathcal{B}$ -Hierarchy

### Theorem

For every natural number  $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ , there exists a game in  $\mathcal{B}_{k+1} \setminus \mathcal{B}_k$ . Every simple game belongs to one of the classes of this hierarchy.



### Example

Weighted and roughly weighted games form the class  $\mathcal{B}_1$ . Fano is critical for  $\mathcal{B}_2$ .

## A faculty vote

There are 99 academics in the Science Faculty. If neither side controls a  $2/3$  majority, then the Dean would decide the outcome as he wished. Here we need 33 thresholds so the game is in  $\mathcal{B}_{33}$ .




# $\mathcal{C}$ -Hierarchy

## Definition

We say that a simple game  $G = (P, W)$  is in the class  $\mathcal{C}_\alpha$ ,  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^{\geq 1}$ , if there exists a weight function  $w: P \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$  such that for  $X \in 2^P$  the condition  $w(X) > \alpha$  implies that  $X$  is winning, and  $w(X) < 1$  implies  $X$  is losing.

Weights of losing coalitions

Weights of winning coalitions




Weights of winning and losing coalitions

## $\mathcal{C}$ -Hierarchy

### Theorem

For each  $1 \leq \alpha < \beta$ , it holds that  $\mathcal{C}_\alpha \subsetneq \mathcal{C}_\beta$ . Every simple game belongs to one of the classes  $\mathcal{C}_\alpha$ .



### Example

Fano game is critical for  $\mathcal{C}_{4/3}$  and the faculty vote game is critical for  $\mathcal{C}_2$ .